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Freedom, Want, and Economic and Social
Rights: Frame and Law
KATHARINE G. YOUNG*

INTRODUCTION: HISTORY AND ANNIVERSARY
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims that all
human beings are free and equal in dignity and rights. The proclamation is an artifact, and an accomplishment, of the normatively
charged global politics at World War II’s end. An anniversary
emphasizes the occasion of this moment’s ―common standard of
achievement for all peoples and all nations.‖1 It reminds us of the
compromises, the settlements, and the opportunities that were a part
of this endeavor. If the discourse of emancipation is ours to reinvent,
as the fact of the Universal Declaration suggests, we can examine the
distance between then and now, them and us, and their aspirations
and our own. At the same time, we can take stock of the profound
achievement of the Universal Declaration, of the distance between
the instrument and what was present before it, and how this feat
informs our laws and politics today.
When compared with the Codes, Charters, Declarations, and Bills
of Rights that preceded it,2 the Universal Declaration’s most remark-

* BA, LLB (Hons) (Melb), LLM Program (Harv), SJD Candidate, Harvard Law School,
Visiting Assistant Professor, Boston University School of Law. I am grateful to Michael
Harper, Frank Michelman, Jeremy Perelman, Hengameh Saberi, Sameer Saran, Henry
Steiner, Adam Shinar, Lucie White, and Margaret Young for sharing their thoughts on a
previous draft, as well as to the participants of the University of Maryland School of Law
Symposium on the 60th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and to
the editors of the re-emerging Maryland Journal of International Law.
1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), art. 25, U.N. Doc.
A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
2. See THE HUMAN RIGHTS READER: MAJOR POLITICAL ESSAYS, SPEECHES, AND
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able innovation lies in its expansive conception of human freedom.
Moving beyond the classical ideal of individual liberty, the freedom
expressed in the Universal Declaration is both material and relational.
Freedom from want, as well as freedom from fear and the freedoms
of speech and belief, belong to the Universal Declaration’s highest
normative aspirations.3 Articles 22 to 27 protect the rights to work, to
social security, to education, and to food, clothing, housing, medical
care, and the social services necessary for wellbeing and health. 4
Everyone is entitled, ―as a member of society,‖ to realization of the
―economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and
the free development of his personality.‖5
How should we commemorate this freedom from want, and the
related economic and social rights, of the Universal Declaration, in
2008? I begin this reflection by reproducing an iconic image of
―Freedom from Want,‖ which appeared on the pages of The Saturday
Evening Post in the United States on March 6, 1943. Although this
picture was published five years prior to the adoption of the
Universal Declaration, it provides a telling snapshot of a popular
American understanding of economic and social rights that would
influence the provisions of the international instrument. The final
shape of the economic and social rights was determined, of course,
by the efforts of all of the delegates to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in 1948.6 Part one of this reflection
DOCUMENTS FROM ANCIENT TIMES TO THE PRESENT (Micheline R. Ishay ed., 2d ed. 2007), for
a collection that locates the history of human rights in both secular and religious traditions
while recognizing the contestability of origins.
3. Universal Declaration, supra note 1, pmbl.
4. Economic and social rights are often distinguished from labor rights on the one hand
and property rights on the other, in order to encompass the rights more directly protective of
human welfare and freedom from want. For the purposes of this reflection, I focus primarily
on the subsistence and welfare rights to food, health, housing, and education. See id.
arts. 22, 25, 26. For a distinguishing analysis, see Shareen Hertel, Human Rights and the
Global Economy: Bringing Labor Rights Back In, 24 MD. J. INT’L L. 283 (2009).
5. Universal Declaration, supra note 1, art. 22.
6. The eighteen-member delegation was drawn from the then-U.N. membership of some
fifty-six states. Most of the present 192 U.N. member states had not (re)gained
independence and had little opportunity to shape the Universal Declaration’s text. Some
scholars draw attention to the influential and independent efforts of Peng-chung Chang from
China, Hernán Santa Cruz from Chile, Hansa Mehta from India, Charles Malik from
Lebanon and Carlos Romulo from the Philippines to counteract the predominance of
Western and Communist viewpoints within the Commission. See, e.g., MARY ANN
GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION
OF HUMAN RIGHTS 224–25 (2002). Others point to the support of the Universal Declaration
by many African and Asian countries after 1948, in order to establish contemporary grounds
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emphasizes the allegorical, if not fully causal, parallels between this
picture and the Universal Declaration’s text.
The interpretation of ―Freedom from Want‖ by popular artist
Norman Rockwell provides a sense of completion to the aspiration
that guides economic and social rights. In contradistinction to the
finality suggested by this image, and in response to its ready critique,
I suggest that economic and social rights are better conceived in
contestable terms, as incomplete, dynamic, and revisable. In parts
two and three of this reflection, I suggest that the challenges posed by
the rights to food, health, housing, and education are among the
Universal Declaration’s greatest. Rather than present an analysis or
interpretation of what these rights protect, I propose a series of
directions. First, I describe what is meant by the role played by
economic and social rights as a frame of discourse within the political
contestations of distributive justice. Secondly, I examine the
operation of economic and social rights as a set of legal principles,
which may or may not be enforceable. In both respects, economic
and social rights operate, not as a confirmed depiction of freedom
from want, agreed to and recognizable to all, but as a discourse of
naming injustices, building institutional responses, and calling on us
to decide which claims for material support genuinely belong to the
Universal Declaration’s expansive and active commitments.
ONE PORTRAIT OF FREEDOM FROM WANT, CIRCA 1943
Norman Rockwell’s ―Freedom from Want‖ appeared as part of his
series on the ―four freedoms,‖ which were proclaimed by Franklin
Delano Roosevelt and later adopted in the Preamble of the Universal
Declaration.7 Drawing from his earlier response, in 1941, to the

to the claim of ―a common standard of achievement.‖ In relation to the economic and social
rights provisions of the Universal Declaration, the relative input of delegates is still
contested. See Daniel J. Whelan & Jack Donnelly, The West, Economic and Social Rights,
and the Global Human Rights Regime: Setting the Record Straight, 29 HUM. RTS. Q. 908
(2007), for a vigorous assertion of the role of the United States, and other Western countries,
against the credit usually given to the Communist countries.
7. ―Freedom from want‖ continues to guide subsequent human rights instruments. See
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights pmbl., Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
pmbl., Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
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―Freedom from Want‖
Norman Rockwell, The Saturday Evening Post
© 1943 SEPS: Licensed by Curtis Publishing, Indianapolis, IN
All rights reserved. www.curtispublishing.com
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challenges of the Great Depression,8 Roosevelt announced that
―necessitous men are not free men‖ in his 1944 State of the Union
Address.9 Domestically, ―freedom from want‖ became the central
justification for his proposed ―second bill of rights,‖ which would
recognize the right to a job, to trade, to a family home, to ―adequate
medical care and the opportunity to achieve and enjoy good health,‖
to a good education, and to ―adequate protection from the economic
fears of old age, sickness, accident, and unemployment.‖10 Internationally, the language of ―freedom from want‖ guided the
influential Atlantic Charter of 1941, where a post-war peace would
be grounded on the ―assurance that all the men in all the lands may
live out their lives in freedom from fear and want.‖11
In both cases, freedom from want—and in the case of the second
bill, the accompanying rights—were introduced as belonging to a set
of public commitments rather than to a legal document for judges to
enforce.12 Ironically, while support for Roosevelt’s second bill of
rights stumbled in the post-war environment of the United States, the
emphasis on economic and social rights would have a pronounced
influence on the Universal Declaration, due in part to the leadership
of the United States delegate and Chair of the United Nations
Commission on Human Rights, and Roosevelt’s widow, Eleanor
Roosevelt. This same leadership would emphasize an intention to
secure the Universal Declaration’s symbolic, rather than binding,

8. See DAVID M. KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM FEAR: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN DEPRESSION
WAR, 1929–1945, at 469–70 (1999) (describing Roosevelt’s message to Congress on
Jan. 6, 1941 announcing the Lend-Lease Bill, shrewdly numbered H.R. 1776).
9. Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the U.S., Message to Congress on the State of the
Union (Jan. 11, 1944), in 13 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT 40–42 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1950).
10. Id.
11. The Atlantic Charter, Joint Declaration by the President of the United States and the
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, 55 Stat. 1603 (Aug. 14, 1941) [hereinafter Atlantic
Charter], reprinted in Elizabeth Borgwardt, “When You State a Moral Principle, You Are
Stuck with It”: The 1941 Atlantic Charter as a Human Rights Instrument, 46 VA. J. INT’L L.
501, 561 (2006). See also Borgwardt, id., at 526–28 (noting the influence of this principle,
and in particular its emphasis on individuals, rather than peoples, countries, or nations).
12. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: FDR’S UNFINISHED
REVOLUTION AND WHY WE NEED IT MORE THAN EVER 83 (2004), for a description of this
feature of the second bill of rights, contrasting this conception with the enforceable bill of
rights of the U.S. Constitution. For the limits of an enforcement model for the Atlantic
Charter, see Borgwardt, supra note 11, at 556 (―To say that the Atlantic Charter did not meet
Austinian standards of enforceability does not really tell us anything about its influence on
wartime political culture, both in the United States and internationally.‖).
AND

16 YOUNG (DO NOT DELETE)

2009]

5/4/2009 2:39 PM

FREEDOM, WANT, AND ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS

187

character.13
Rockwell’s depiction of ―Freedom from Want‖ is a celebration of
abundance and national tradition. The artist chose to portray this
dimension of freedom in a scene of family conviviality at an
American Thanksgiving. (The painting is otherwise known as ―The
Thanksgiving Dinner.‖) An attentive, capable, and apron-clad
woman serves an oversized turkey to a crowded table. Behind her
stands the kindly figure of the household head, his right hand ready to
carve up the communal meal. Several guests, spanning different
generations, smile and converse with relaxed patience. The nourishment is emotional as well as material, and the table placement is
open, seemingly including the viewer in the happy setting.
Of course, ―Freedom from Want‖ cannot deliver the inclusion that
it promises. In fact, the painting seems to presage the cultural,
gender, and national struggles to come. In celebrating the material
comforts brought about by this freedom, it takes for granted a now
caricatured celebration of patriarchy, consumerism, and cultural
uniformity. The man’s role is unquestionably that of provider, the
woman’s is that of server, and the seated guests do nothing to contest
the hierarchy within the family unit. The freedom is secured
privately, and enjoyed within the four walls of the family home. 14
The figurative ―wants‖ to be satisfied, suggested by the order and
decorum of the table setting, are recognizably middle class.15 The
result is a snapshot of American aspirations that are not only
anachronistic, but are also at odds with the sensitivity towards social
subordination associated with the women’s rights and civil rights
movements, which were themselves supported by the aspirations of
the Universal Declaration.16
13. See ROGER NORMAND & SARAH ZAIDI, HUMAN RIGHTS AT THE UN: THE POLITICAL
HISTORY OF UNIVERSAL JUSTICE (2008) (describing the influence of the American delegation
in the decision to jettison an enforcement mechanism for the Universal Declaration).
14. See LIZABETH COHEN, A CONSUMERS’ REPUBLIC: THE POLITICS OF MASS CONSUMPTION IN POSTWAR AMERICA 56 (2003) (noting the choice of subject of freedom from
want, ―not as a worker with a job, nor as government beneficence protecting the hungry and
homeless, but rather as a celebration of the plenitude [sic] that American families reaped
through their participation in a mass consumer economy‖).
15. See AMY BENTLEY, EATING FOR VICTORY: FOOD RATIONING AND THE POLITICS OF
D
64–65, 84 (1998) (suggesting that the image conceals the American underclass
and that as America campaigned for freedom from want to the world, many were ―literally
and figuratively barred from sitting at the table and partaking of the meal‖).
16. Universal Declaration, supra note 1, art. 2 (―Everyone is entitled to all the rights and
freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour,
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The image’s appeal for Americans—it was apparently the artist’s
most successful attempt within the four freedoms series and remains
one of his most recognizable illustrations—was not shared elsewhere.
As the artist himself noted, ―[t]he Europeans sort of resented it
because it wasn’t freedom from want, it was overabundance.‖17 Of
course, Rockwell was illustrating for an American audience: his later
depiction of ―The Golden Rule,‖ presented to the United Nations, is
differently composed,18 reflecting a diversity of peoples that was
unlikely to have been accepted by the editors of The Saturday
Evening Post.19 Nevertheless, ―Freedom from Want‖ seems to
remind, too starkly, that American prosperity has been secured within
a global economic order in which many are marginalized. The
scene’s fresh gentility stands apart from the ―ongoing, grimy, disenabling want of genuine indigence.‖20 The painting’s tendency to
evoke a freedom to prosper, rather than a genuine freedom from
want, sours its appeal in a world in which material resources are so
uneven and so scarce for many. The end of want, not the celebration
of abundance, would be a more fitting approximation of ―dignity and
rights‖ when a full third of the global population is too poor to
protect itself against chronic undernourishment, illiteracy, child labor,
and an inability to access safe water, basic sanitation, life-saving
medicines, and adequate shelter.21

sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or
other status.‖).
17. NORMAN ROCKWELL, MY ADVENTURES AS AN ILLUSTRATOR 315 (1988). Rockwell
relates how he prevailed over the ―darned high-blown‖ imagery of the four freedoms with
―the best idea [he]’d ever had:‖ to use his Vermont neighbors as models. Id. at 312–13.
18. See United Nations Photo, Norman Rockwell Mosaic ―The Golden Rule,‖
http://www.unmultimedia.org/photo/detail/313/0031379.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2009), for
a depiction of Rockwell’s mosaic, inscribed with the words ―DO UNTO OTHERS AS YOU
WOULD HAVE THEM DO UNTO YOU,‖ installed on the third floor of the United Nations
Conference Building in New York.
19. Apparently Rockwell had wanted to depict African Americans in his illustrations, but
was prevented from doing so by the editors of The Saturday Evening Post. RICHARD
HALPERN, NORMAN ROCKWELL: THE UNDERSIDE OF INNOCENCE 3 (2006).
20. Id. at 73. Halpern draws on Freud to explain Rockwell’s appeal to Americans. Such
an analysis could itself apply to the aspiration for freedom ―from want‖ as the very human
drive that is impossible to satisfy. See Lucie White, „If You Don‟t Pay, You Die‟: Death and
Desire in the Postcolony, in EXPLORING SOCIAL RIGHTS: BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE 57
(Daphne Barak-Erez & Aeyal M. Gross eds., 2007), for a subtle observation of the different
social priorities given to wants and needs.
21. For a moral inquiry into the role of American (and other Western industrial nations’)
wealth in contributing to global poverty, see THOMAS POGGE, WORLD POVERTY AND HUMAN
RIGHTS (2d ed. 2008). Using World Bank data from 2004, Pogge notes that 39.7% of the
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Should the same criticism apply to the Universal Declaration?
Like the image, the language of the Universal Declaration reveals
both its strident political aspirations and embedded economic, social,
and cultural assumptions. Of course, the aspirations and assumptions
of Rockwell’s ―Freedom from Want‖ and the Universal Declaration
are not identical. With the input of representatives from Latin
America and other states,22 the economic and social rights that were
enshrined within the Universal Declaration are different from those
of Roosevelt’s New Deal: more cognizant of human dignity and
(relatively) more accepting of the limits of rights, their co-relation
with other rights and with duties and responsibilities.23 Rockwell was
channeling Roosevelt’s freedom from want, not the Universal
Declaration’s, and not without distortion: the public aims of the New
Deal are notably invisible.24 Moreover, the combination of nostalgic
idealism and technical realism inimitable to Rockwell masked the
connections between poverty and conflict that had been a leading
motivation—both American and international—for the entrenchment
of economic and social rights. The importance of freedom from want
was signaled before, during, and after World War II as a means to
confront the Great Depression, the rise of Hitler in Europe, and the
links between the two.25 Just as was achieved by Rockwell’s
―Freedom from Want,‖26 this connection has been papered over in the
world’s population lives in severe poverty. Id. at 2.
22. See JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: ORIGINS,
DRAFTING AND INTENT 191–93 (1999); see also Whelan & Donnelly, supra note 6.
23. See, e.g., Universal Declaration, supra note 1, art. 29. For a contrast between AngloAmerican freedom and the values of the Universal Declaration, see GLENDON, supra note 6,
227–232. For an example of recent work in value-based comparison and its effect on law,
see EDWARD J. EBERLE, DIGNITY AND LIBERTY: CONSTITUTIONAL VISIONS IN GERMANY AND
THE UNITED STATES (2002); Sandra Liebenberg, The Value of Human Dignity in Interpreting
Socio-Economic Rights, 21 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 1 (2005).
24. Elizabeth Borgwardt, FDR‟s Four Freedoms and Wartime Transformations in
America‟s Discourse of Rights, in BRINGING HUMAN RIGHTS HOME: A HISTORY OF HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 31, 33–34 (Cynthia Soohoo et al. eds., 2008).
25. KENNEDY, supra note 8, at 469–70; see also Mark R. Shulman, The Four Freedoms:
Good Neighbors Make Good Law and Good Policy in a Time of Insecurity, 77 FORDHAM L.
REV. 555 (2008).
26. See also William Graebner, Norman Rockwell and American Mass Culture: The
Crisis of Representation in the Great Depression, 22 PROSPECTS 323, 340 (1997) (pointing
to Rockwell’s difficulty in comprehending poverty). Rockwell’s illustration of the stock
market crash of 1929 depicted a tradesman, a dog, a woman, and a well-dressed gentleman
peering at an ominous newspaper headline. Graebner suggests that the picture omitted
Rockwell’s trademark concentration on facial expressions because of the artist’s ―inability to
understand the emotions that a falling market could generate.‖ Id.
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intervening period.27
The Universal Declaration’s own anachronism is highlighted in the
gendered language of its provisions and in the paths of protection that
were assumed by its framers to secure many of the objects of each
right. In 1948, the national basis of welfare states was largely taken
for granted. The claims of labor had been the central paradigm for
economic and social rights contestation. Redistribution occurred
through owner to (primarily male) worker, as well as from rich to
poor. Mass production, employment, and national industry were the
accepted formulas for wealth generation and security. The stable
hierarchy of the traditional family unit was central to the aspiration
for the right of everyone
to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being
of himself and his family, including food, clothing, housing
and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to
security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability,
widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstance beyond his control.28
These protections, along with the rights to social security, employment, and education, were the Universal Declaration’s basic
social architecture.29
In the provisions of the Universal Declaration, just as in the
Rockwell painting, the aspiration towards material security was
encased in a series of assumptions about the accepted paths and
forms of social justice. The anniversary of the Universal Declaration
invites us to reflect critically on the institutionalized patterns of
economic, social, and cultural value, and the status harms that were
an ineluctable part of this aspiration. This is what makes the popular
portrait of ―Freedom from Want‖ so suggestive. But it is a mistake to
end the examination at the harms to gender, sexuality, or cultural

27. See GLENDON, supra note 6, at 238 (noting that the drafters of the Declaration had
recognized the root causes of atrocities in poverty, and that this connection was forgotten in
the intervening period).
28. Universal Declaration, supra note 1, art. 25.
29. This architecture shares much with the New Deal’s emphasis on ―social citizenship.‖
Compare William E. Forbath, Constitutional Welfare Rights: A History, Critique and
Reconstruction, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1821 (2001) (analyzing the emphasis on decent work,
livelihood, and material security in the New Deal), with Frank I. Michelman, In Pursuit of
Constitutional Welfare Rights: One View of Rawls‟ Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REV.
962 (1973) (presenting an analysis of justice as fairness and a social minimum).
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pluralism that were a part of the understanding of this aspiration
when it was committed to an international text. We should also
reflect on the achievements of the vigorous forms of recognition
politics that have rendered status harms so palpable, but which have
left to one side the material harms that the original aspirations were
aiming to correct.30
Such a reflection is part commemorative and part critical. It
suggests that the redistributive implications of freedom from want
have been sidelined in our concern with the completed shape of this
freedom and the acceptance of civil and political rights as its vehicle.
It therefore seeks to reintroduce economic and social rights as a
central piece of the achievement of the Universal Declaration, and to
demonstrate how such rights are best understood, as both frame and
law.
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS AS FRAME
The rights contained in the Universal Declaration are often debated
in terms of law or morality. In these terms, the Universal Declaration
has fueled both positivist and philosophical analyses, which seek to
establish the content of international law or of settled political
morality. The presentation of economic and social rights as ―frame‖
is different from these projects. Although the frame of rights is made
more forceful by its potential overlap with both law and morality, 31 it
is not necessarily restricted to the questions raised by each. Instead,
the frame of economic and social rights engenders political, moral,
and sometimes legal contestation that strives for both universalism in
expression and the location of institutional responsibility in response.
For example, a claim of a right to food, clothing, housing, medical
care, or education creates the terms under which hunger, indigence,
medical neglect, or barriers to schooling can be communicated and
understood as injustices, rather than as misfortunes.32 Such a claim
also seeks to identify the terms of an appropriate response, in
30. Here I borrow from Nancy Fraser’s depiction of the challenges of the politics of
redistribution in an age of identity politics. NANCY FRASER & AXEL HONNETH, REDISTRIBUTION OR RECOGNITION?
A POLITICAL-PHILOSOPHICAL EXCHANGE 49 (2003).
Fraser’s recent introduction of the question of representation, alongside recognition and
redistribution, informs my discussion of framing. NANCY FRASER, SCALES OF JUSTICE
(2009).
31. The Universal Declaration provides a good example of how this overlap is generated.
32. For a classic expression, see JUDITH N. SHKLAR, THE FACES OF INJUSTICE (1990)
(describing the changing understanding of the causes of the potato famine in Ireland).
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policies, laws, or broader institutions.
The concept of framing was devised in the field of sociology to
portray how social actors interpret, understand, and communicate
their interests.33 A frame creates an interpretive lens, a way of
understanding a problem that unites other actors and discredits
opponents. Applying the frame of rights to a challenge such as
hunger may foreground the more structural causes of the problem (or,
in normative terms, an injustice), and different objects of recourse or
remedy.34 Economic and social rights allow social actors who are
agitating for the protection of their material interests to demonstrate
why their condition or treatment is injurious to their dignity and other
values, why this is important, and which actors bear or share
responsibility.35
The success of the economic and social rights frame articulated in
the Universal Declaration is threefold. First, it establishes a
universalized language that differs from a particularist assertion of
the satisfaction of human needs specific to one or another individual
or group. We might say that this universalism is post-national,
because it signals the importance of common interests across
different country arrangements and across the varied experiences of
particular groups within them. Hence, the shared minimum of
resources established by the implementation of economic and social
rights extends to everyone. In this way, the frame of rights, rather
than of religion, race, national origin, or class, can unify the claims of
a diverse group which may be grappling with a systemic problem
from different perspectives.36 Of course, during the recruitment of a
movement around economic and social rights, there may be a degree
of separation associated with the experience of socio-economic
marginalization and urgent economic need. Yet the language of
claim-making invited by economic and social rights is open to all.

33. David A. Snow, Framing Processes, Ideology, and Discursive Fields, in THE
BLACKWELL COMPANION TO SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 380 (David A. Snow et al. eds., 2004).
34. For a prominent analysis, see HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE
AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 23 (2d ed. 1996). See also POGGE, supra note 21.
35. For a complementary philosophical analysis, having regard to the social ―influenceability‖ that is necessary to the recognition of human rights and renders intelligible economic
and social rights, see Amartya Sen, Elements of a Theory of Human Rights, 32 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 315, 327 (2004).
36. E.g., JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS: THE FIGHT FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS
162–66 (2005) (suggesting the ways in which rights worked to unite and motivate a Latino
immigrant group more effectively than faith traditions or class solidarity).
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This universalism confronts an age-old problem of distributive
politics: that political power usually corresponds with economic
power, and that political disadvantage usually corresponds to
economic disadvantage. This fact applies to both well-established
democratic settings, where serious material deprivations may be
confined to a minority, and to low-income democracies, where it may
be experienced by the majority as against an increasingly unresponsive state.37 By invoking universal programs which only
implicitly target particular groups, redistributive claims have had
greater prospects for success in the United States.38 Directly distributive contestations attract stigma towards claimant groups—
creating apathy at best, and backlash at worst, in those required to
transfer resources. If all are perceived to be worthy or entitled to
resource minimums, political support is more likely to be maintained.
Universalism within redistributive politics is an innovation of the
Universal Declaration, shared with other emancipatory agendas, but
settled within the powerful discourse of rights.
Secondly, the frame of economic and social rights establishes an
agent–duty-holder relationship that is different from the frames
provided by other distributive contestations, such as those calling for
the satisfaction of ―basic needs‖ or the urgent attainment of certain
―development goals.‖39 Asserting a right to food, housing, education,
or medical care is to acknowledge a duty or responsibility by
others—whether individuals or institutions—to work to secure it.
Such an inquiry is absent in the vocabulary of needs, which offers a
more passive and supplicant plea to meet certain material requirements without the (admittedly more difficult) prescription of how
such needs must be addressed and by whom.40
Unlike needs claims, rights claims direct active attention to both
37. E.g., Peter P. Houtzager, Introduction: From Polycentrism to the Polity, in
CHANGING PATHS: INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE NEW POLITICS OF INCLUSION 1
(Peter P. Houtzager & Mick Moore eds., 2003).
38. For an early example, see THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS:
THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 44 (1992) (describing the
dependence, before the New Deal, of ―cross-class distributions rather than . . . class-oriented
categorical measures‖). Skocpol concedes the difference in the path to European social
democracy and the United States. Id. at 48.
39. See U.N. Millennium Declaration, G.A. Res. 55/2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/2 (Sept. 18,
2000); see also U.N. Millennium Development Goals, http://www.un.org/
millenniumgoals (last visited Mar. 31, 2009).
40. Jeremy Waldron, Rights and Needs: The Myth of Disjunction, in LEGAL RIGHTS 87
(Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1996).
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agent and duty-holder. Within the Universal Declaration, ―everyone,
as a member of society,‖41 is an agent and everyone bears responsibility, whether towards one another through work, family, or
community relations,42 through the ―organs of society,‖43 or through
the greater ―social and international order.‖44 The state is not
enumerated as a duty-holder. Its importance is nowhere expressed
but everywhere assumed, given that it was governments who were
the final arbiters of the text. Nonetheless, even within the statecentric paradigm of 1948, Article 22 of the Universal Declaration
proclaims that both ―national effort and international cooperation‖
would lead to the realization of the economic and social rights of all
persons.45
In the last sixty years, this multiplicity of duty-holders has become
ever more relevant. The international influence of corporate globalization, as well as policies of structural adjustment that were initiated
by the Bretton Woods institutions for developing countries, have
diminished the responsiveness of states in matters of distribution,
thus reducing in turn the attractiveness of a normative paradigm so
clearly dependent on the state. In such a context, some commentators
have suggested that the Universal Declaration’s ―organs of society‖
can extend to business groups;46 others have suggested that the
―social and international order‖ refers to the obligations of international institutions.47
Nonetheless, it is clear that the state still bears relevance, sandwiched between different global, supranational, and local orders.48
The frame of economic and social rights continues to recognize the
primary responsibility of the state to deliver resources or revise the
structures of entitlement to ensure the basic material protection of
41. Universal Declaration, supra note 1, art 22.
42. Id. art. 29.
43. Id. pmbl.
44. Id. art. 28.
45. Id. art. 22; see also id. art. 28.
46. Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, John Ruggie, Protect, Respect
and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human Rights, ¶¶ 52–53, delivered to the
Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008); see also Declaration on the
Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and
Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, G.A. Res.
53/144, Annex art. 18, U.N. Doc. A/RES/53/144/Annex (Mar. 8, 1999).
47. POGGE, supra note 21.
48. See generally DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY (3d ed. 2006).
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everyone is met, while giving scope to a more global and institutionally variegated distributive contestation. From the Universal
Declaration’s emphasis on ―national and international efforts‖49 has
developed more explicit duties of international assistance and
cooperation.50
Thirdly, the frame of normativity provided by the rights to food,
health, housing, or education is not extra-legal or legal-skeptic. Just
as the claims of economic and social rights are addressed to the state,
while maintaining a focus on other institutions, they also address law.
This relationship is often overlooked, as commentators of economic
marginalization have sought to prove their radicalism by advocating
disengagement with law. This critique claims to identify an alternative emancipatory possibility outside of current legal arrangements
in order to create a politics immune from cooptation or domination.51
Often, this criticism conflates the sometimes demobilizing effect of
litigation with the effect of law itself.52 The recommendation to
maintain localized projects towards material security within civil
society, and outside of the state, is a prime example.53
In the current environment, such skepticism misfires. The
widespread influence of neoliberal ideology and the accompanying
projects of privatization and deregulation have in many places
diminished access to economic and social protections, and the
responsiveness of the state.54 While the chastening of this agenda
may have cooled the enthusiasm for these projects, it has not led to
greater protections.55 Under these conditions, the anti-state, anti-law
49. Universal Declaration, supra note 1, pmbl.
50. This is more explicitly expressed in the Universal Declaration’s successor treaty
dealing with economic and social rights, the ICESCR, supra note 7, art. 2(1) (establishing
obligations on state parties, which include obligations of technical assistance and cooperation).
51. For a response to the critique, see Orly Lobel, The Paradox of Extralegal Activism:
Critical Legal Consciousness and Transformative Politics, 120 HARV. L. REV. 937 (2007)
(refuting the co-optation critique as specifically cogent to legal strategies).
52. For a diagnosis of this tendency which remains pertinent, see Alan Hunt, Rights and
Social Movements: Counter-Hegemonic Strategies, 17 J.L. & SOC’Y 309 (1990).
53. Lobel, supra note 51, at 962–66 (citing examples from ―glocalization‖ and civil
society revivalism).
54. See Special Rapporteur on the Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
Danilo Türk, The Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, delivered to the U.N.
Econ. & Soc. Council, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/16 (July 3, 1992).
55. For a recent attempt to grapple with this new context, see THE WASHINGTON
CONSENSUS RECONSIDERED: TOWARDS A NEW GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (Narcis Serra & Joseph
E. Stiglitz eds., 2008).

16 YOUNG (DO NOT DELETE)

196

MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

5/4/2009 2:39 PM

[Vol. 24:182

agenda recommended by some advocates provides no resources with
which to counteract the further evisceration of the state. Indeed, the
relegation of the aspiration to material security to an extra-legal space
may be unable to halt the diminishing access to certain goods and
services or to certain public functions and may even accelerate it.
Instead, the frame of economic and social rights continues to hold
the state responsible for its delivery of entitlement or, conversely for
the way in which it confers rights, privileges and immunities on
private actors. In administrative, educational, or even disruptive
terms, the politics of economic and social rights continue to involve
law. This politics may even involve litigation. With this insight in
hand, economic and social rights are used by actors to contest politics
and law in pragmatic, critical, and innovative ways.56
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS AS LAW
If the operation of economic and social rights as frame enhances
our understanding of the moral and political stakes of distributive
politics, its operation as law is equally dynamic. Economic and
social rights can work to exert legal pressure on decision-makers in
an institutionally diverse set of scenarios. At the constitutional level,
this goes beyond what judges are capable of enforcing, to conducing
lawmakers and decision-makers in their ordinary legislative and
administrative settings.57 At the international level, this requires
attention beyond instances of dispute resolution, to the way in which
the rights expressed in international agreements and customary
international law generally affect the behavior of states.58
Economic and social rights figure as law in many countries and are
guaranteed in a significant number of constitutions. A legally
protected right to food, health care, housing, or education has myriad
potential operations. At the constitutional level, economic and social
56. For a collection of notable examples, see STONES OF HOPE: HOW AFRICAN ACTIVISTS
RECLAIM HUMAN RIGHTS TO CHALLENGE GLOBAL POVERTY (Jeremy Perelman & Lucie
White eds., forthcoming 2009).
57. See Frank I. Michelman, Socioeconomic Rights in Constitutional Law: Explaining
America Away, 6 INT’L J. CONST. L. 663, 667 (2008).
58. This general question has given rise to a burgeoning literature. For prominent
expression, see LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 47 (2d ed.
1979) (suggesting that ―almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law
and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time‖); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do
Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997) (presenting one causal
explanation for Henkin’s empirical insight).
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rights may translate to a justiciable complaint, giving rise to a judicial
response.59 Or they may figure as subjective entitlements requiring
certain procedural protections.60 Or they may resemble a directive
principle of state policy, exerting pressures on political actors that
may be described as legal, even if unenforceable.61 The operation of
such rights as law presents new questions about how the structure of
private law might impinge on economic and social rights, how courts
are capable of enforcing rights, and how states are obliged to protect
them within the global economic order.
Turning first to the international level, there is a conspicuous, if
not coincidental, parallel between the general legal status of the
Universal Declaration and the specific legal operation of the
economic and social rights protected within it. The ―legal‖ status of
the Universal Declaration was left deliberately ambiguous at the time
of its proclamation by the United Nations General Assembly.
―[T]eaching and education‖ would promote respect for rights, and
―progressive measures, national and international,‖ would secure
their recognition and observance.62 Explicit state duties would have
to wait until codification in the subsequent human rights treaties,
especially the ICCPR and the ICESCR. The legal significance of the
Universal Declaration would rest on the apparent paradox, identified

59. See infra text accompanying notes 85–95 (regarding the South African experience);
see also Ellen Wiles, Aspirational Principles or Enforceable Rights? The Future for SocioEconomic Rights in National Law, 22 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 35 (2006) (referencing different
constitutional texts); COURTS AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: AN
INSTITUTIONAL VOICE FOR THE POOR? (Roberto Gargarella et al. eds., 2006) (describing
developments in various jurisdictions, and especially in Latin America, including Brazil,
Bolivia, and Colombia).
60. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (holding that procedural due process
requires a hearing before the removal of welfare benefits). For an examination of the
relations between U.S. courts, legislatures, and agencies that conceives of a right to
disentrench public agencies that have been immune from review, see Charles F. Sabel &
William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV.
L. REV. 1015 (2004) (describing education, housing, and mental health litigation).
61. See, e.g., Bunreacht nah Éireann [Ir. CONST., 1937] art. 45; Const. of the Republic of
Ghana, arts. 34–41; INDIA CONST. arts. 38, 39, 41–48A. For the narrowing of the gap
between directive principles and enforceable rights in India, see, e.g., Jayna Kothari, Social
Rights Litigation in India: Developments of the Last Decade, in EXPLORING SOCIAL RIGHTS:
BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE 171 (Daphne Barak-Erez & Aeyal M. Gross eds., 2007).
62. Universal Declaration, supra note 1, pmbl. The General Assembly called upon
member countries to publicize the test and ―cause it to be disseminated, displayed, read and
expounded principally in schools and other educational institutions.‖ G.A. Res. 217D (III),
¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948). For the similar view of Roosevelt’s economic
declaration, see SUNSTEIN, supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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in 1950, that it did not constitute ―a legal instrument expressive of
legally binding obligations . . . [yet could nevertheless] prove, by dint
of a clear realisation of that very fact, a significant landmark in the
evolution of a vital part of international law.‖63
Despite this ambiguity of enforcement, the rights expressed in the
Universal Declaration influence law and policy in significant ways.
The Universal Declaration influenced the development of later
conventions on human rights, such as the ICCPR and ICESCR.
Moreover, it continues to be invoked as a primary source of human
rights in international agreements,64 despite the presence of these
later, expressly binding, human rights instruments.
Moreover, many have asserted that the Universal Declaration
represents customary international law.65 Arguments about the
Universal Declaration’s status as custom usually track the following
logic. First, customary status is bootstrapped to the United Nations
Charter, as the Universal Declaration is argued to constitute the
authoritative interpretation of the human rights obligations of the
United Nations Charter, itself understood to be customary international law.66 Secondly, it arises from the repeated invocation of the
Universal Declaration in state practice, its reflection in countless
treaties, constitutions and legislation, and in the decisions of both
national and international courts.67
Why does the status of the Universal Declaration as custom make a
difference? If the International Court of Justice, for example, held
that the economic and social rights recognized in the Universal
63. HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 417 (1950).
64. See the role of the Universal Declaration in, for example, the United Nations
Millennium Declaration, supra note 39, ¶ 25 (resolving to ―respect fully and uphold the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights‖); see also U.N. Millennium Development Goals,
supra note 39; World Conference on Human Rights, June 14–25, 1993, Vienna Declaration
and Programme of Action, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (July 12, 1993).
65. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 701, reporters’ note 2 (1987) (suggesting that ―[p]ractice accepted as building customary
human rights law includes: virtually universal adherence to the United Nations Charter and
its human rights provisions, and virtually universal and frequently reiterated acceptance of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, even if only in principle‖).
66. See, e.g., Louis B. Sohn, The Human Rights Law of the Charter, 12 TEX. INT’L L.J.
129, 133 (1977). An additional argument points to the status of the Universal Declaration as
a general principle of law: Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(c), June 26,
1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993.
67. See John P. Humphrey, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Its History,
Impact and Juridical Character, in HUMAN RIGHTS: THIRTY YEARS AFTER THE UNIVERSAL
DECLARATION 21, 29–37 (Bertram G. Ramcharan ed., 1979).

16 YOUNG (DO NOT DELETE)

2009]

5/4/2009 2:39 PM

FREEDOM, WANT, AND ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS

199

Declaration belonged to the category of custom, such rights would be
understood to be generally binding on all states as a matter of
international law.68 Such a finding would point to the existence of
international legal obligations for particular states, like the United
States, which have failed to ratify the successor treaty on economic
and social rights69 (unless such states claimed they had persistently
objected to the status of custom, an argument belied by support for
the Universal Declaration). International commentators following a
monist analysis would also assert that the status of customary law
would enable economic and social rights to be invoked before, and
applied by, national courts in countries (again, like the United States)
in which custom is understood to be part of the law of the land.70 In
Alien Tort Statute claims in the United States, for example, the
Universal Declaration has been used as a source of custom by courts
enforcing the ―the law of nations‖ for foreigners in civil actions for
conduct committed abroad.71 While some have interpreted the United
States Supreme Court decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain72 as
diminishing the relevance of the Universal Declaration, it continues
to be invoked as a coterminous source of custom by certain courts.73
Nonetheless, the commentators who assert that the Universal
Declaration has customary status are selective about which provisions

68. Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 66, art. 38(1)(b). This
statement reflects the category of custom as a source of international law, rather than the
binding nature of decisions of the International Court of Justice, which is reserved to the
parties in the instant case. See U.N. Charter art. 94(1); Statute of the International Court of
Justice, supra, art. 59. For a statement that decisions of the International Court of Justice are
not self-executing in the United States, see Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1358–1359
(2008). But see id. at 1384 (Breyer, J., dissenting). I do not here address the question of the
authority of international and national courts to declare custom.
69. ICESCR, supra note 7.
70. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). A discussion of the ability of
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), to exert an anti-monist pressure on U.S.
courts is beyond the scope of this reflection. Compare Curtis A. Bradley et al., Sosa,
Customary International Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869
(2007), with Beth Stephens, Comment, Sosa v. Alvarex-Machain: “The Door is Still Ajar”
for Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 533, 548 (2004).
71. See Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982); see also Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630
F.2d 876, 879, 882 (2d Cir. 1980) (noting the approval of the Universal Declaration by the
General Assembly and its incorporation in the constitutions of eighteen nations.)
72. 542 U.S. 692, 734 (2004) (―[T]he Declaration does not of its own force impose
obligations as a matter of international law.‖).
73. See the variety of post-Sosa judicial responses collected by Tai-Heng Cheng, The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights at Sixty: Is It Still Right for the United States?, 41
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 251, 279–80 (2008).
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constitute custom, and often neglect economic and social rights from
this identification.74 There is a weird logic to this disavowal. For
example, those who assert a deductive approach to ascertaining the
customary law of human rights suggest that the rights that appear in
the Universal Declaration, but that are later omitted from the ICCPR,
are unlikely to constitute custom. Nonetheless, they neglect a similar
exercise with respect to the ICESCR, in which the economic and
social rights of the Universal Declaration are substantially
replicated.75 This is despite the fact that the quantitative support for
each convention is similar: the ICCPR presently enjoys 160 states
parties compared to the ICESCR’s 164.76 In qualitative terms, the
difference in ratifications between the two covenants is more noteworthy, at least for American commentators, with the United States
being a prominent non-party to the latter treaty. In addition, the
differences in the content of the obligations,77 and the mechanisms of
implementation,78 between the ICCPR and the ICESCR, are a
possible reason to reject the relevance of the latter to the question of
custom. Yet with the recent adoption of the Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
74. Humphrey, supra note 67, at 29 (limiting the analysis of custom to ―the justiciable
provisions of the Declaration, including certainly, those enunciated in articles two to twentyone‖). For a critique, see Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law:
Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L. 82, 95 (1992)
(commenting on the Restatement’s restriction to prohibitions on slavery and torture). In the
context of the Alien Tort Statute, see especially Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d
233, 244 (2d Cir. 2003) (rejecting Article 25 of the Universal Declaration and other
instruments protective of the rights to life and health as ―insufficiently definite to constitute
rules of customary international law‖).
75. E.g., CHRISTIAN TOMUSCHAT, HUMAN RIGHTS: BETWEEN IDEALISM AND REALISM 38,
40 (2d ed. 2008) (pointing to the Universal Declaration’s rights to asylum, nationality and
the right of ownership that did not appear in the ICCPR; and elsewhere noting that the
ICESCR takes up the economic and social rights of the UDHR, but adds additional content,
such as the right to health).
76. For status of ratifications, see United Nations Treaty Collection, available at
http://treaties.un.org (follow ―databases‖ hyperlink; then follow ―Status of Treaties‖
hyperlink).
77. Compare ICCPR, supra note 7, art. 2(1), (requiring States Parties to ―respect and to
ensure to all individuals . . . the rights recognized‖), and id. art. 2(3) (requiring provision of
remedy for violations), with ICESCR, supra note 7, art. 2(1) (requiring States Parties to take
steps to the maximum of available resources, with ―a view to achieving progressively the full
realization of the rights‖).
78. ICCPR, supra note 7, art. 28 (establishing the Human Rights Committee); see also
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res.
2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) (establishing the individual complaint
mechanism).
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which establishes the authority of the Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights to receive and consider communications,
such a distinction loses force.79 Moreover, enforceability should not
be equated with legality, which belies the focus on state practice and
opinio juris for the formation of customary international law.
The ideological polarization of the Cold War has often been cited
as a main obstacle to satisfying the test of state practice and opinio
juris. The global environment is now very different, and some
commentators suggest that international aid responses to crises
prompted by natural disasters, like the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004,
or to ongoing food, health, or education crises in certain regions, have
formed sufficient state practice for the development of custom.80 The
focus on aid, however, overlooks the ways in which states fail to
observe economic and social rights in other interactions, such as trade
policy.81
Putting to one side the question of custom, it is clear that the
Universal Declaration has indirectly influenced national law. It has
―migrated‖ to national (and state) constitutions through constitutional
drafting and interpretation.82 In the case of drafting, constitutional
economic and social rights sometimes preceded, more often
postdated, and on some occasions coincided with the timing of the
79. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, G.A. Res. 63/117, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/117 (Dec. 10, 2008). Once it enters into
force with the completion of ten ratifications, this Protocol will directly counter the Universal Declaration’s exhortatory model by providing a forum for individuals or groups of
individuals to claim, before the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, that a
state party has violated the economic and social rights provisions of the Covenant, or for a
state party to claim that another party is not fulfilling an obligation. Id. arts. 2, 10.
80. For an argument that the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) represent custom
in the area of economic and social rights, see Philip Alston, Ships Passing in the Night: The
Current State of the Human Rights and Development Debate Seen Through the Lens of the
Millennium Development Goals, 27 HUM. RTS. Q. 755, 773 (2005); see also Smita Narula,
The Right to Food: Holding Global Actors Accountable Under International Law, 44
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 691, 793 (2006) (noting the response to the tsunami).
81. See, e.g., Andras Sajo, Socioeconomic Rights and the International Economic Order,
35 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 221, 250 (2002) (emphasizing the trade regime).
82. See Gerard L. Neuman, Human Rights and Constitutional Rights: Harmony and
Dissonance, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1863 (2003). For the metaphor of migration, see generally
THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS (Sujit Choudhry ed., 2006). See also Judith
Resnik, Law‟s Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism‟s
Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564 (2006). For an example of the influence of the
Universal Declaration on state constitutions in the United States, see Vicki C. Jackson,
Constitutional Dialogue and Human Dignity: States and Transnational Constitutional
Discourse, 65 MONT. L. REV. 15 (2004) (describing the Montana Constitution).

16 YOUNG (DO NOT DELETE)

202

MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

5/4/2009 2:39 PM

[Vol. 24:182

Universal Declaration. In the case of interpretation, advocates and
judges have been influenced by the provisions of the Universal
Declaration.83 For example, when the Supreme Court of the United
States was asked to decide on the effect of the Constitution on
welfare protection, Justice Marshall referred to the economic and
social rights of the Universal Declaration.84
The Constitution of South Africa is the most recent and most farreaching example of the entrenchment of economic and social rights.
There, the Bill of Rights recognizes the rights to access housing,
health care, food and water, social security, and education, just as it
protects civil and political rights.85 In 1948, South Africa had
83. This was the drafters’ intent. See, e.g., LAUTERPACHT, supra note 63, at 356
(identifying the role of national courts and other organs as ―the most effective way of giving
reality‖ to international human rights).
84. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 521 n.14 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(citing Article 25 of the Universal Declaration, along with several law review commentaries,
in support of the application of the Fourteenth Amendment to welfare rights). The
homegrown origins of ―freedom from want‖ make Justice Marshall’s recourse to the
Universal Dec-laration unremarkable, although he was not necessarily suggesting the ―wise
parentage‖ line of justification for the use of foreign law. Compare United States v. Then,
56 F.3d 464, 469 (2d Cir. 1995) (Calabresi, J., concurring) (suggesting that ―[w]ise parents
do not hesitate to learn from their children‖), with The Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials
in U.S. Constitutional Cases: A Conversation Between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice
Stephen Breyer, 3 INT'L J. CONST. L. 519 (2005) (Justice Breyer suggesting different
epistemic grounds to the use of foreign law). For an examination of the indirect influence of
the Universal Declaration in the courts of other countries, see Hurst Hannum, The Status of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and International Law, 25 GA. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 287 (1995/1996).
85. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ss. 26 (housing), 27 (health care, food, water and social
security), 29 (education):
26. Housing
1. Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing.
2. The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its
available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right.
3. No one may be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished,
without an order of court made after considering all the relevant circumstances.
No legislation may permit arbitrary evictions.
27. Health care, food, water and social security
1. Everyone has the right to have access to
a. health care services, including reproductive health care;
b. sufficient food and water; and
c. social security, including, if they are unable to support themselves and
their dependants, appropriate social assistance.
2. The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its
available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these
rights.
3. No one may be refused emergency medical treatment.
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opposed the inclusion of economic and social rights within the
Universal Declaration, on the basis that ―a condition of existence
does not constitute a fundamental human right merely because it is
imminently desirable‖ and because effective implementation could
make it ―necessary to resort to more or less totalitarian control of the
economic life of the country.‖86 South Africa abstained from the vote
to adopt the Universal Declaration. Apartheid became the official
policy of the Government of South Africa the same year. That the
South African constitutional system now represents a leading
example of entrenched economic and social rights is proof that the
distance between normative aspirations and social realities can be
bridged.
Two aspects are particularly instructive about the present operation
of economic and social rights in South Africa. First, economic and
social rights offer a rich set of tools to analyze the distributive impact
of the background laws—the rights, immunities, and privileges—that
undergird market arrangements. For example, economic and social
rights, operating as law, reengage the links between the protection of
....
29. Education
1. Everyone has the right
a. to a basic education, including adult basic education; and
b. to further education, which the state, through reasonable measures, must
make progressively available and accessible.
2. Everyone has the right to receive education in the official language or
languages of their choice in public educational institutions where that education
is reasonably practicable. In order to ensure the effective access to, and
implementation of, this right, the state must consider all reasonable educational
alternatives, including single medium institutions, taking into account
a. equity;
b. practicability; and
c. the need to redress the results of past racially discriminatory laws and
practices.
3. Everyone has the right to establish and maintain, at their own expense,
independent educational institutions that
a. do not discriminate on the basis of race;
b. are registered with the state; and
c. maintain standards that are not inferior to standards at comparable
public educational institutions.
4. Subsection (3) does not preclude state subsidies for independent educational
institutions.
86. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Human Rights Comm’n, Comments from
Governments on the Draft International Declaration on Human Rights, Draft International
Covenant on Human Rights and the Question of Implementation, ¶ 25, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/82/Add.4 (Apr. 27, 1948).
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property rights and democracy. Because the Constitution sets out a
requirement on the state to ―respect, protect, promote and fulfill the
rights in the Bill of Rights,‖87 and because it binds the judiciary, as
well as other organs of the state, to develop the common law in order
to protect or limit rights,88 the economic and social rights of the
Constitution establish a legal basis from which to observe the distributive implications of private law. In other words, the Constitution
radiates outwards to include private relations that may impact on
economic and social rights.
In the twelve years of South African jurisprudence since the
adoption of the post-apartheid Constitution of 1996, this ―horizontal‖
dimension has not been fully developed. Nevertheless, there are
important signals of how the Constitution may influence private law
in certain key respects. For example, the Constitution’s guarantee of
everyone to have access to housing has been respected by South
African courts by recognizing the state’s duty to address the needs of
potentially homeless people when performing legal evictions from
private land—evictions necessary to respect private property.89 The
right to housing provision has been used to reduce the administrative
burdens on the state when engaged in emergency accommodations,
and to create additional hurdles for the execution of land in the sale
of petty debts.90 Additionally, it has been a source of a rule requiring
the state to provide alternative accommodations during evictions
from unsafe buildings.91 These legal steps confound the dichotomy
of positive and negative rights that for so long has operated as a
shorthand categorization—and diminution—of economic and social
87. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 s. 7(2).
88. Id. s. 8(1), (3).
89. President of the Republic of S. Afr. v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd. 2005 (5) SA 3
(CC) (S. Afr.) (holding that the constitutional property rights of the landowner and
constitutional housing rights of squatters were both impaired by a failure of state to provide
alternative accommodation).
90. See Minister of Pub. Works v Kyalami Ridge Envtl. Ass‟n 2001 (3) SA 1151 (CC) (S.
Afr.) (holding government provision of emergency accommodation need not have satisfied
all administrative requirements, in light of the constitutional rights of flood victims); Jaftha v
Schoeman 2005 (2) SA 140 (CC) (S. Afr.) (holding South Africa’s Magistrates’ Court Act
unconstitutional where it permitted the sale in execution of people’s homes in order to satisfy
petty debts).
91. See Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Beria Twp. v City of Johannesburg 2008 (3) SA
208 (CC) (S. Afr.) (finding that while the City has obligations to eliminate unsafe and
unhealthy buildings, its constitutional duty to provide access to adequate housing means that
potential homelessness must be considered when a City decides whether to evict people from
buildings).
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rights as opposed to other rights. The operation of economic and
social rights as law directs us instead to the more fruitful question of
how seriously both negative and positive obligations are taken by the
state.92
Secondly, South Africa’s experience with economic and social
rights has helped to overcome one of the central obstacles to the legal
operation of economic and social rights, which relates to their legal
enforcement. The justiciability of economic and social rights authorizes judges to hear complaints with respect to economic and social
rights infringements, and to order appropriate remedies. The ongoing
concern about the justiciability of economic and social rights has
been directed to their suspected tendency to inflate judicial power as
against the so-called democratic branches. Although the danger is
present with all forms of judicial review,93 it has been treated as
particularly pressing for economic and social rights. This difficulty,
which centers on the perceived lack of institutional competence or
legitimacy on the part of judges, has been met by judicial restraint
and innovative remedies on the part of the South African Constitutional Court.
In the very first right to housing case, for example, the
Constitutional Court declared that the government’s housing policy,
which had not provided for the emergency needs of people in the
position of the claimants, was unreasonable and therefore inconsistent with the protection offered by the right to access housing. 94
Likewise, in adjudicating on the right to access health care, the
Constitutional Court ordered the government to desist from preventing the roll-out of an anti-retroviral drug to prevent the motherto-child transmission of HIV, additionally requiring the government
to establish testing and counseling programs.95
In both cases, the Constitutional Court declined to entrench a
―minimum core‖ of economic and social rights, which is the doctrine
employed by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
to determine a minimum legal content for economic and social
92. For an examination of the state action doctrine and its relation to economic and social
rights, see MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND SOCIAL
WELFARE RIGHTS IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ch. 6–7 (2008).
93. See Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J.
1346 (2006).
94. South Africa v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) (S. Afr.).
95. Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) (S. Afr.).
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rights.96 (South Africa’s jurisprudence on economic and social rights
is linked to international law but does not merely reproduce it.97) The
determination by the Constitutional Court to assess the positive
obligations of economic and social rights under the rubric of a
reasonableness test represents a more flexible option, and one that
leaves open a degree of contestation around the meaning of economic
and social rights, as well as a response to the competence and
legitimacy concerns mentioned above.98
South Africa’s example is instructive for national enforcement, yet
remains confined to the national sphere in which, as we have seen,
the Universal Declaration was preoccupied. Conceivably, the model
of judicial review employed in South Africa may inform the
supranational and international tribunals which adjudicate economic
and social rights.99 A less sanguine assessment, however, would
emphasize the limits of this model for effecting legal change in the
global economic order, in which the enjoyment of economic and
social rights is often determined. Only an analysis of extraterritoriality can bring attention to the way in which one state’s actions
interfere with the enjoyment of economic and social rights in another
state, and to the way in which it can be held accountable. There are
some precursors. In sanctions policy, for example, the Committee
has set out legal obligations for States to observe.100 How this may
apply in other international interactions, such as in aid or trade,101 is a
96. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm’n on Econ., Soc. & Cultural
Rights, General Comment No. 3: The Nature of States Parties‟ Obligations, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1990/8 (Dec. 14, 1990).
97. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 s. 39 (requiring the Court to consider international law, and
allowing the consideration of foreign law, when interpreting the Bill of Rights).
98. For analysis, see Katharine G. Young, The Minimum Core of Economic and Social
Rights: A Concept in Search of Content, 33 YALE J. INT’L L. 113 (2008).
99. This orientation would assist the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights in its new role. See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 79. For an analysis of the justiciability of economic
and social rights within present United Nations, European, Inter-American, and African
human rights regimes, see David Marcus, The Normative Development of Socioeconomic
Rights Through Supranational Adjudication, 42 STAN. J. INT’L L. 53 (2006).
100. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm’n on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights,
General Comment No. 8: The Relationship Between Economic Sanctions and Respect for
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1997/8 (Dec. 12, 1997).
101. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm’n on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights,
General Comment No. 12: The Right to Adequate Food (Art.11), ¶¶ 18, 36–37, 39, U.N.
Doc. E/C.12/1999/5 (May 12, 1999); General Comment No. 14: The Right to Highest
Attainable Standard of Health, ¶¶ 38–42, 64, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000);
Poverty and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ¶¶ 16–17,
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challenge for which the South African model has limited answers.
CONCLUSION
The ambition of the Universal Declaration’s emphasis on freedom,
want, and economic and social rights was great. Rockwell’s
portrayal of ―Freedom from Want‖ fails to capture this aspiration
because it presents freedom from want as a comfortable, hierarchical
and private affluence, more redolent of the American prosperity that
followed World War II’s end, rather than the years of insecurity that
preceded it. Yet it is significant that the painting was presented, in its
poster form, with the caption ―OURS. . . to fight for—FREEDOM
FROM WANT.‖ On one view, such words merely conjure up the
war effort, and the sacrifice, that was part of the image’s popular
dissemination.102 On another view, these words suggest a corrigibility of aspiration, a recognition of the politics that lie behind the
attempt to give meaning to the aspiration of freedom from want and
the rights that accompany it. Perhaps the anachronisms and assumptions—flaws which, it must be conceded, would accompany every
concrete portrayal of the realization of economic and social rights—
may be forgiven when accompanied by the hope and choice that such
words convey.
This reflection has presented the dual operation of economic and
social rights, with a similar attitude of hope and choice, as both
―frame‖ and ―law.‖ These categories are porous: the frame of politics
addresses, is bolstered by, and is impaired by, law, even as it raises
separate questions. The frame of rights provides a way of presenting
freedom from want in universalist, justice-based, and potentially legal
terms. The law of rights provides a method of exerting legal pressure
on decision-makers, including but not only limited to judges, in both
public and private law, and in national and international spheres. The
oscillation between the two furthers the continuing relevance of
economic and social rights, rather than defeats it. In fact, this dual

21, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2001/10 (May 10, 2001), General Comment No. 15: The Right to
Water, ¶¶ 18, 33–36, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20, 2003); ECOSOC, Comm’n on
Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur, Paul Hunt, Mission to the World Trade
Organization, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/49/Add.1 (Mar. 1, 2004) (prepared by Paul Hunt).
102. Rockwell’s Four Freedoms series toured the country to raise money by the sale of
war bonds. See Lester C. Olson, Portraits in Praise of A People: A Rhetorical Analysis of
Norman Rockwell‟s Icons in Franklin D. Roosevelt‟s “Four Freedoms” Campaign, 69 Q. J.
OF SPEECH 15, 22, 23–24 (1983).
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operation is instructive about the operation and durability of the
Universal Declaration as a whole. After sixty years, the daily
challenges and opportunities of the economic and social rights of the
Universal Declaration remain ours.

